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 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
During the last decades of the 20th century the world has experienced an impressive increase in the amount and relative importance of border-
crossing economic interlinkages. Transnational corporations (TNCs) whose 
organizational structures transcend polities and connect various national societ-
ies have been playing a leading role in this process. Th e TNC system has grown 
substantially and gained historically unprecedented power in the political world-
economy (UNCTAD 2000: Overview). Th e old question of how transnational 
corporations aﬀ ect economic and social development in their host countries thus 
arises with renewed relevance. 
Th e ﬁ ndings of previous research result in a quite bleak picture. Although 
standard economic theory argues transnational ﬁ rms to be important catalysts 
of development and worldwide convergence, numerous cross-national studies on 
data from the late 1960s and early 1970s support the opposite view of dependen-
cia and world-system theorists. Th ey all show that TNC aﬃ  liates rather add 
to inequality and underdevelopment than to socio-economic progress in their 
host countries (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; Dixon and Boswell 1996a, 
* We would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Christopher Chase-Dunn, Andrew 
Jorgenson, Stefan Kollmuss, Rachel Matthey, Th omas Volken-Reinert, Patrick Ziltener, and an 
anonymous reviewer for their valuable support and critical comments.
Transnational corporations (TNCs) have 
reached historically unprecedented weight and 
power in the world’s political economy. Th us, 
the old question of how these corporations 
aﬀ ect global development is nowadays more 
signiﬁ cant than ever. While some scholars 
claim that corporate globalization will even-
tually close the worldwide development gap, 
many others contend that TNC activities lead 
to insuﬃ  cient exploitation of growth potentials 
within the host country, thereby hindering con-
vergence of national income levels. Th e present 
study aims at assessing the validity of these 
controversial positions by confronting them 
with the results of past and present empirical 
research. In the ﬁ rst part, we examine the eﬀ ect 
of TNC presence on intra-national income 
inequality by reviewing the most recent cross-
national studies dealing with this issue. In the 
second part, we present the results of our own 
research, which analyzes the eﬀ ect of TNC 
presence on economic growth in a sample of 
84 countries. Th e contemporary empirical 
evidence discussed in the ﬁ rst part as well as 
the results of our own analyses tend to conﬁ rm 
earlier ﬁ ndings. Th ey suggest that dependence 
on TNC activities increases inequality with-
out adding to economic growth. However, 
the strong negative eﬀ ect of TNC presence 
on growth found in analyses of data from the 
late 1960s cannot be reproduced in our con-
temporary analysis. In a signiﬁ cant number of 
cases, the potentially harmful consequences of 
TNC activities seem to have been overcome by 
adequate countervailing state actions. 
abstract
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b). Th ese results, however, do not necessarily hold for the contemporary era. As 
the impressive growth of the TNC system since the 1960s (and, with increased 
velocity, since the 1980s) has been accompanied by various qualitative trans-
formations, the eﬀ ects of TNC presence on national development might have 
changed as well (Hübner 1998). It is thus necessary to analyze more recent data 
and compare the results with previous ﬁ ndings. Up to now, surprisingly few stud-
ies have addressed this problem and assessed the actual applicability of previous 
results to this contemporary era of increased global economic integration. Th e 
present study aims at closing this gap. We review the most recent literature on 
the relation between TNC presence and income inequality, and we also explore 
the eﬀ ect of TNC presence on economic growth by means of new cross-national 
analyses based on data from the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Th e question of how TNCs inﬂ uence wealth and social development in their 
host countries is not a new question. It constitutes the core of a vivid sociologi-
cal debate that has lasted for almost three decades. Quantitative cross-national 
research on the topic started as early as 1975 with simultaneously published 
studies from authors in three diﬀ erent countries, Britain, US, and Switzerland 
(Stoneman 1975, Chase-Dunn 1975, Bornschier 1975). Th e three authors pio-
neered a novel approach. While acknowledging the immediate positive impact 
of foreign direct investment on economic growth they claimed that, in the longer 
run, development models based on a strong presence of TNCs would result in 
higher inequality and in under-utilization of growth potentials. Unfortunately, 
this view was sometimes misunderstood as claiming that the presence of TNCs 
prevents growth altogether (Firebaugh 1992), although none of the pioneering 
authors denied the fact that even dependent (semi-) peripheral economies are 
able to experience some economic success. By “reducing the growth potential” 
and “under-exploitation of convergence forces” the authors rather meant that 
TNCs prevent their host countries from growing as fast as possible and from 
climbing up in the worldwide division of labor (which, in turn, means that 
TNCs unwillingly perpetuate the status quo of an unequal and sharply stratiﬁ ed 
world). Th eir notion of underdevelopment—which will be applied in this paper 
as well—thus consisted of two aspects: (1) unequal development within a society 
as indicated by pronounced and enduring inequality, and (2) under-utilization of 
the convergence possibilities usually open to late developers.1 
Following the initial studies from 1975, many other researchers who also dis-
trusted the supposedly beneﬁ cial eﬀ ects of TNCs began testing their assump-
tions by means of quantitative cross-national research as well.2 Despite some 
minor quarrels on speciﬁ c ﬁ ndings they all came to the same empirical conclu-
sion—they again found that TNC presence retards development. Accordingly, 
the school or paradigm these authors represent is usually termed the “critical” 
school. Th is name may be misleading, though. Since the early scholars mainly 
theorized power relations and conﬂ icting interests, it would be more correct 
to call them “realists.” Not believing in the classical formula according to which 
“capital is capital,” they insisted that the institutional sources of capital and the 
corresponding interests matter. Explicitly or implicitly, these researchers were 
the pioneers of the renewal of economic sociology within the framework of the 
political world-economy. According to this critical, or realistic, school, the basic 
problem with TNCs in world development is that two diﬀ erent institutional 
agendas collide: the agenda of global capital accumulation followed by the system 
of TNCs on the one hand and the agenda of national needs of development on 
the other. We will return to this problem in the next section. 
Th e article is organized as follows: In section 2, we review the three most 
important theoretical perspectives on the development eﬀ ects of TNCs: (i) the 
“conventional” position of standard economics and modernization theory, (ii) 
the “pessimistic” position of dependencia and world-system theorists, and (iii) 
the most recent, yet still sketchy, “skeptical” position proposed, among others, by 
UNCTAD. In the third section we discuss some methodological problems that 
plague comparative research on TNCs, while the fourth section summarizes the 
empirical evidence that has been presented in the relevant literature up to this 
point. At ﬁ rst glance, the ﬁ eld discussed in this fourth section may seem to be 
over-studied. Th is impression is certainly wrong, though, since the topicality of 
the time periods studied has not caught up with economic globalization since 
the 1980s. As the very few studies covering the 1980s and 1990s suﬀ er from some 
shortcomings and partly contradict each other, we need to perform further tests. 
Th e results of our new research are presented in the ﬁ fth section, which also con-
1. In a historical perspective, taking full advantage of convergence forces means that 
countries that started poor have been able to industrialize and eventually achieve core 
status in the world system. Examples of non-European cases include Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan. 
2.  Th ose scientists who do believe in the beneﬁ cial impacts of TNCs have presented 
remarkably few, if any, cross-national tests of their hypotheses. Th ere is a huge variety 
of studies on the short-term eﬀ ects of foreign direct investment (FDI) inﬂ ows, but the 
structural and long-lasting changes brought about by the presence of TNCs in developing 
economies have been neglected—although analyzing ﬂ ow measures like foreign investment 
is conceptually distinct from the study of the accumulated impact of TNCs.
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Th e hypotheses of this position then read as follows:
h1.1 A stronger TNC presence is associated with more income inequal-
ity. Th is, however, is caused by the contribution of TNCs to growing 
income.
h1.2 Th e presence of TNCs is an advantage since their inputs accelerate 
convergence.
Hypotheses relating to conditional relations/interactions: 
h1.3 Since TNCs provide technology and modern outlooks, the income-
generating productivity of domestic investment should be greater the 
larger the presence of TNCs in a host country.
h1.4 Since the resources provided by TNCs are particularly scarce at low 
levels of development, the positive eﬀ ect of TNC presence is more 
signiﬁ cant in poorer countries than in others.
The Pessimistic Position 
Th e pessimistic position is based on a more realistic view of the divergent 
interests of TNCs and national governments. According to the proponents of 
this view, TNCs enter foreign markets to do proﬁ table business there without 
paying any attention to the needs of the majority of the host country’s popula-
tion. TNC aﬃ  liates do business according to, and within, the global logic of 
capital accumulation of their parent corporations. Yet, the pessimistic position 
contends, they are not only economic actors. At the same time they are involved 
as “national corporate citizens” in the political economy of the host country and, 
like any other interest group, try to inﬂ uence the government to act in their 
favor. Although this behavior is normal politics it alters power constellations 
and preferences in the national political economy. Since TNC aﬃ  liates are nor-
mally among the largest corporations in the host countries, and since the huge 
resources of their parent corporations abroad back them, they have substantial 
inﬂ uence on the agenda of the host government. 
Whereas the optimal agenda for developing country governments aims at 
moving up in the worldwide division of labor (by improving the value added 
in ever more sophisticated branches of the economy), this is not a high priority 
item on the agenda of TNCs. Foreign ﬁ rms, indeed, choose a given host country 
exactly because of the relative availability of resources and relative prices that the 
government would or should want to change in order to achieve upward mobility 
in the worldwide division of labor. Th us, countries that are highly “penetrated” 
by foreign ﬁ rms will ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to propose and successfully implement an 
agenda of economic upgrading against the opposition of foreign interests. 
According to the pessimistic position, the hierarchical division of labor 
tains an evaluation of the hypotheses. In the sixth section we list our conclusions 
and close the paper with some suggestions for the future research agenda. 
THREE THEORETICAL POSITIONS 
Th e question of how TNCs inﬂ uence national development has generated a 
long-lasting and intense scholarly debate. Two “classical” positions can be distin-
guished in this debate: the conventional position derived from standard economic 
theory, and the pessimistic position proposed by dependencia theorists and most 
proponents of the world-system approach. In the next sections we brieﬂ y review 
the two approaches in order to derive from them the hypotheses that will guide 
our study. Moreover, we discuss a third approach, which is termed the “skepti-
cal” position. In contending that TNC presence may have positive and negative 
eﬀ ects, this promising new perspective not only combines elements of the two 
classical positions but also puts the state and issues of “dependency management” 
back on the agenda. It should be noted, however, that the skeptical approach has 
not (yet) produced testable hypotheses. We are thus unable to assess its validity 
by means of cross-national testing. 
The Conventional Position 
Th e core arguments of the conventional position are well known, since they 
reﬂ ect common sense in standard economics as well as modernization theory. 
Late development, conventionalists contend, is a function of capital inﬂ ows, 
the creative adaptation of imported technology and the diﬀ usion of modern 
perspectives among the population. Since TNCs and their aﬃ  liates provide all 
of these badly needed resources—fresh capital, new ideas and technologies, and 
modern values—right on the spot, they may help their host countries to achieve 
faster development and catch-up in the world system. Hence, countries with a 
marked TNC presence should be better oﬀ  than countries where foreign ﬁ rms 
are absent or less actively involved. 
Regarding the eﬀ ects on income distribution, proponents of the conven-
tional position are somewhat less optimistic and concede that TNC activities 
may well create further inequality. TNC presence is argued to foster the process 
of industrialization that, in turn, creates dualistic structures and inequality. 
However, given that the eﬀ ect of TNC activities is transmitted by economic 
success and further development, it necessarily follows Kuznets’ famous inverted 
U-curve. Once the turning point is reached, FDI-induced development should 
actually start lowering the level of inequality. Th us, the hypothesized eﬀ ect is 
neither direct nor long lasting. Rather, inequality has to be seen as a necessary 
but temporary price to be paid for the economic success brought about by TNCs 
and their investment. 
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within transnational corporations—the most important functions are per-
formed in core countries, while more specialized and less sophisticated value-
added activities are transferred to the periphery—not only corresponds with 
the existing stratiﬁ cation of the world system but also perpetuates it. Th e TNC 
system thus stabilizes the division of the world into diﬀ erent sections with 
unequal access to sophisticated economic activities and diﬀ ering opportunities 
to generate national income. A national political economy that enters late devel-
opment with the supposed help of TNCs will ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to actually improve 
its position in the worldwide division of labor, and the optimal or potential con-
vergence is hampered.
With regard to inequality, the argument is similar to the one proposed by 
the conventional position (h1.1): TNC presence leads to higher inequality. But 
unlike conventionalists, who claim a transitory impact, pessimists contend that 
inequality generated by TNC activities become institutionalized and, thus, 
enduring. Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao (1979), for example, claim that TNC 
presence aﬀ ects various aspects of the internal power distribution, which, in 
turn, are related to overall income inequality. TNC presence, they argue, alters 
traditional social relations, the power distribution among formal organizations, 
the bargaining position of labor and the way in which resources provided by the 
state authorities aﬀ ect life-chances. 
Th e hypotheses of the pessimistic position thus read as follows:
h2.1  More pronounced TNC presence is related to higher income inequal-
ity. Th is is not a transitory but, rather, a permanent relationship, since 
TNC presence transforms power relations in the host country. 
h2.2  Higher TNC presence does not add to growth and may even hinder 
convergence once fresh TNC investment slows down. 
Hypotheses relating to interactions/conditional effects:
h2.3  As a consequence of the altered political economy, total (domestic) 
investment contributes relatively little to economic growth in coun-
tries with strong TNC presence as compared to more independent 
countries. Th is is because the powerful TNC aﬃ  liates claim inputs 
and infrastructure from the state that could otherwise be used to sup-
port the bulk of medium and small-sized domestic companies. 
h2.4 Th e lower the level of development, the more the bargaining process 
between host country governments and TNCs is likely to result in 
solutions that favor the latter. Since the resources needed to reach a 
fairer bargain are particularly scarce in the poorest countries, the sup-
posed negative eﬀ ect of TNC presence should be more pronounced 
there. 
The Skeptical Position 
In addition to the classical positions discussed so far, the most recent edi-
tions of UNCTAD’s World Investment Reports (particularly UNCTAD 
1999) and a few other publications (Blomström/Kokko 1996; Khor 2000; Kiely 
1998) propose an innovative third perspective. We have decided to call this new 
approach “skeptical” because it accuses both the pessimistic as well as the con-
ventional position of being over-simplistic and too one-sided. According to the 
proponents of the skeptical approach, TNC presence is neither unequivocally 
good nor unequivocally bad for host country development. Rather, the net eﬀ ect 
of TNC presence is argued to vary in accordance with the quality of policy pack-
ages adopted by diﬀ erent countries. 
More speciﬁ cally, the adherents of the skeptical position acknowledge the 
potential problems related to TNC presence, and they make clear that “FDI 
promises more than it delivers” (Kumar, cit. in Khor 2000:39). At the same 
time it is claimed that “politics matter,” and that a reasonable “dependency man-
agement” may make a diﬀ erence. Kiely (1996:60), for example, contends that 
“[s]tates in the Th ird World are not simply passive victims of the activities of 
TNCs, and some have quite successfully regulated the activities of foreign capital 
for their own developmental ends.”3 In other words, the eﬀ ects of TNC pres-
ence on income inequality and economic growth are argued to be ambiguous. 
In some cases, the skeptical approach claims, TNC activities are associated with 
high inequality and low economic growth. In other cases, however, host country 
governments may prevent these negative eﬀ ects from working by pursuing suc-
cessful countervailing policies. 
Th e main problem with this new approach is that it represents a research 
program rather than a well-elaborated theory. Th e principal questions are still 
unanswered (i.e., the skeptical position does not give any detailed indication of 
which policies could prevent the negative eﬀ ects of TNC presence from work-
ing). Nor is it made clear under what conditions a country is able to adopt such 
3.  It should be noted that “intelligent” dependency management is itself a result of 
state autonomy, the ability to create suitable policies and a marked capacity to implement 
these measures (for the statist position, see Herkenrath, forthcoming, as well as Bornschier 
and Trezzini 1997, 2001). In our opinion, only developmental states characterized by a 
high degree of autonomy and capacity can push through the national development agenda 
against the interests of foreign investors. In these cases, however, TNC presence may 
indeed add much less to inequality than elsewhere, and contribute positively to economic 
growth.
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measures. In the case of UNCTAD’s World Investment Reports these questions 
are deliberately avoided. Th e authors contend that there is no generally appli-
cable package of “intelligent” TNC policies, and that “[a]ny good strategy must 
be context speciﬁ c, reﬂ ecting the level of economic development, the resource 
base, the speciﬁ c technological context and the competitive setting” (UNCTAD 
1999: 315). Other researchers simply state that questions related to host country 
policies vis-à-vis foreign TNCs require further research (Blomström/Kokko 
1996: 33). Fact is that the skeptical approach has not yet produced any testable 
hypotheses. 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Th e central aim of this paper is to assess the validity of the conventional and 
the pessimistic hypotheses presented in the previous sections. Before we go over 
to discussing past and recent empirical ﬁ ndings, some methodological issues 
need to be mentioned, though. At ﬁ rst glance, measuring the relative weight of 
foreign ﬁ rms in a national economy may appear to be an easy task. However, 
looking at it again, operationalizing the importance of TNC activities (i.e. the 
degree of an economy’s dependence on foreign investment) turns out to be quite 
problematic. 
Th e earliest studies on the subject estimated the degree of dependence on 
TNCs by measuring the number of foreign-owned enterprises present in a 
country, but this rather crude indicator is unsuitable for at least two reasons: On 
the one hand it does not take into account the existence of joint ventures between 
local investors and foreign ﬁ rms. On the other hand it neglects the highly vari-
able size of foreign aﬃ  liates. Accordingly, more recent studies—including our 
own—measure the relative importance of the foreign-owned sector by looking 
at the accumulated stocks of inward-oriented FDI, which are then weighted by 
the size of the whole economy (as measured by GDP ﬁ gures or total capital 
stocks). Information on FDI stocks is usually taken from UNCTAD’s World 
Investment Reports. Th is alternative measure actually avoids the problems men-
tioned above—but it has other shortcomings. Although the data are provided 
by a well-known institution, their quality is not beyond doubt. On the contrary, 
there are substantial reliability problems, and these are again accompanied by 
problems concerning the indicator’s validity. 
Reliability Problems
Careful reading of the footnotes and comments on the FDI data presented in 
UNCTAD’s World Investment Reports reveals an alarming picture. It becomes 
evident, for instance, that only very few national statistical bureaus provide 
information on all three components of FDI, i.e. equity investment, re-invested 
earnings, and loans provided by the parent ﬁ rm. In most cases only one or two of 
these components can be taken into account when measuring the value of accu-
mulated FDI inward stocks.4 Th e other problem with UNCTAD’s measures of 
FDI inward stocks is that they constitute mere estimates and that they refer to 
extremely variable time periods. In the case of Kenya, for example, the foreign 
direct investment stock is estimated by adding up all FDI inﬂ ows after 1970, 
whereas in the case of Lesotho only inﬂ ows after 1980 are taken into account. 
Estimates for the Seychelles relate to FDI inﬂ ows after 1976 (UNCTAD 1999: 
Notes to table b.3 in the Appendix). Hence, the data and any statistical ﬁ nding 
based on them must be interpreted with extraordinary care. 
Validity 
Unfortunately, reliability issues are not the only problems plaguing quan-
titative research on TNC activities and foreign capital penetration. One must 
also question whether FDI stocks constitute valid indicators of foreign inﬂ uence 
and dependence. Th ere are at least three problematic points we should mention. 
First, any FDI-based enterprise can expand its activities by taking out loans from 
domestic ﬁ nancial institutions. Since such transactions are not included in the 
deﬁ nition of foreign direct investment, FDI stocks give a very imprecise impres-
sion of the actual “value” or weight of TNC aﬃ  liates (Henneberger et al. 1996: 
420).5 Second, foreign direct investment is suﬃ  cient, but not imperative, for cre-
ating dependence and establishing unequal relations. According to UNCTAD 
(1995: 384) there exists a great variety of other instruments by which foreign 
enterprises are able to establish control over the management of another ﬁ rm 
and obtain an eﬀ ective voice in the political economy of the host country: “Th ere 
are non-equity forms of FDI, and they include, ‘inter alia’, subcontracting, man-
4.  Furthermore, it should be noted that the conceptual distinction between long-last-
ing direct investment and short-term portfolio investment varies signiﬁ cantly when com-
paring diﬀ erent countries and time periods (Henneberger et al. 1997: 420). In Germany, for 
instance, which is a very important home country for FDI ﬂ ows, the more common 10 
criterion—the concept of foreign direct investment usually implies that the foreign inves-
tor owns at least 10 of the shareholders’ voting power—has only just replaced the 20 
rule, which in September 1989 had replaced the earlier 25 rule (Henneberger/Graf 1996: 
footnote 1).
5.  Th is casts some doubt on the common practice of confounding FDI with (real) 
investment undertaken by foreign-owned ﬁ rms and of comparing FDI with “domestic” 
investment. Unlike the concept of gross domestic investment, FDI concerns the purchase 
of ﬁ nancial capital, which is not necessarily translated into real investment. 
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agement contracts, turnkey arrangements, franchising, licensing and product 
sharing.” Th e third point concerns the diﬀ ering capital requirements in the vari-
ous sectors and branches of the economy. In the tertiary sector a relatively small 
investment can buy signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence on a whole branch and allow a ﬁ rm to 
establish a leading position, whereas in the extractive sector the same amount of 
money might have no weight at all. In sum, looking at aggregate capital ﬁ gures 
seems to be a rather crude way of estimating the economic and political inﬂ uence 
of TNCs. 
Given these criticisms, how is it that almost all contemporary empiri-
cal research, including our own, still uses aggregate FDI data to measure the 
“weight” and inﬂ uence of TNCs? Th e answer is very simple: Disaggregated data 
on FDI in the various sectors of an economy are available only for a handful 
of (developed) nations. Unfortunately, the same is true for other indicators of 
TNC activities, including non-equity forms of investment. Total FDI stocks are 
the only measures that can be obtained for a broad sample of countries. And, 
concerning these stocks, the ﬁ gures listed in UNCTAD’s World Investment 
Reports still seem to constitute the most comprehensive and reliable data set one 
can get—despite all shortcomings. Nonetheless, the methodological problems 
discussed here should be kept in mind when it now comes to interpreting the 
ﬁ ndings of past and recent quantitative research on TNCs. 
OVERVIEW OF THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
Income Inequality 
With regard to income concentration, both the conventional and the pes-
simistic position outlined in section 2 expect the same result: a positive relation-
ship between TNC activity and inequality (hypotheses h1.1 and h2.1). Th erefore, 
it comes as no surprise that all cross-national studies measuring income inequal-
ity around 1970 actually ﬁ nd a signiﬁ cant (positive) relationship with the degree 
of TNC presence, even when other relevant predictors of income distribution 
are also included in the model (for a summary and some re-analyses of early 
research, see Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985: chapter 8). However, the con-
ventionalist assumption—that TNC presence encourages inequality only by 
means of further economic development—has to be rejected. Most of the studies 
Bornschier and Chase-Dunn discuss ﬁ nd that TNC presence remains strongly 
related to inequality even when explicitly controlling for the curvilinear eﬀ ect of 
per capita income.6 In addition, Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao (1979) ﬁ nd strong 
empirical support for their assumption that the eﬀ ect of TNCs on inequality is 
transmitted by institutional changes, and is, thus, enduring. Th ese facts rather 
favor the hypothesis of the pessimistic position (h2.1).7 
Alderson and Nielson (1999) corroborate the previous ﬁ ndings, although 
they analyze a greater number of cases and a much longer time period. In their 
very comprehensive study, Alderson and Nielson draw upon the high-quality 
data set of Deininger and Squire (1996) for their inequality measures. Pooling all 
available information on TNC presence and income inequality over the whole 
period from 1947 to 1996, they reach a total of 488 observations on 108 coun-
tries. Th e results are quite clear. Using linear regression techniques, Alderson 
and Nielson ﬁ nd a strong and statistically solid association between the degree 
of TNC presence and inequality. Additional tests, however, reveal a moderate 
curvilinear relation: when TNC presence reaches a very high level, its eﬀ ect on 
inequality diminishes. Th at is, in countries where foreign ﬁ rms control almost all 
(formal) economic activity, further increases in TNC presence no longer add to 
inequality. Th e usual eﬀ ect may even be reversed in these contexts.8 But Alderson 
and Nielson show that not only the presence of TNC but also their investment 
(i.e. fresh FDI inﬂ ows) is signiﬁ cantly related to income inequality, which makes 
it very diﬃ  cult, and rather unlikely, that highly dependent countries escape from 
the traps of TNC-led development. 
In all, Alderson and Nielson are able to support the conclusions of earlier 
research by means of more reliable inequality measures and reveal new relations 
that coincide just as much with the pessimistic position. Th e only problem with 
their study is that the issue of contemporary relations remains unresolved, since 
6.  Indirectly, Deininger and Squire (1996: 586 ﬀ .) call the conventionalist assumption 
into question as well, when they ﬁ nd no support for the Kuznets hypothesis in its dynamic 
version. Th ere can hardly be an indirect eﬀ ect of TNC presence on inequality via faster 
economic growth as long as there is no systematic relationship between the latter. 
7.  According to Firebaugh and Beck (1994: 642, 647), TNC activities not only 
encourage relative deprivation (income inequality) but also impede the development of life 
chances. Th e reduction in child mortality and the increase in caloric consumption brought 
about by economic growth are almost three times smaller in countries with marked TNC 
presence than in others. TNC-led growth thus underperforms when it comes to ﬁ ghting 
poverty and child mortality. However, our own re-analyses with data for the 1980s fail to 
conﬁ rm the earlier ﬁ ndings (results not shown).
8.  Note that a curvilinear pattern does not imply an actual turning point within the 
range of observed data. In some cases, signiﬁ cant square terms represent “ceiling” eﬀ ects and 
diminishing returns.
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observations for the 1980s and 1990s represent only one part of the sample.9 Up 
to now there is a total of four quantitative cross-national studies that exclusively 
analyze more recent data, namely Tsai’s analysis of observations for the mid-
1970s (Tsai 1999), Beer’s study on the situation in the mid-1980s (Beer 1999), 
and Kentor’s analysis of structural equation models (Kentor 2001) as well as the 
very recent study of Beer and Boswell (2002) that both control for the eﬀ ects of 
reverse causation. 
By analyzing a total of 53 observations from 33 countries, Tsai (1995) is able to 
replicate the well-established positive relationship between TNC presence and 
inequality. At ﬁ rst glance, the ﬁ ndings presented in the previous literature seem 
to be corroborated once more. But by including geographical dummies and inter-
action terms, which transform the original models into conditional equations, 
Tsai detects notable regional diﬀ erences. In Latin America, the varying degree of 
TNC presence observed across countries and time shows no systematic relation 
with income distribution at all, whereas TNC activities in East and Southeast 
Asia seem to contribute signiﬁ cantly, and substantially, to income concentration. 
In order to make sense of his results, Tsai introduces the notion of a “socially 
tolerable ceiling for inequality.” Th e ceiling for inequality, he argues, was reached 
in Latin American countries well before the period covered by the data sample 
and, unlike their Asian counterparts, Latin American elites cannot allow further 
increases in inequality if they want to secure their privileges. Th us, although the 
high levels of inequality in Latin America are actually due to this region’s long-
lasting dependence on foreign direct investment, the marginal impact of further 
increases in TNC presence is negligible. 
Beer (1999) who analyzes a sample of 66 countries and focuses on observa-
tions around 1985 comes to somewhat diﬀ erent conclusions. Her analyses again 
fully support the assumptions of the pessimistic position. Just like the stud-
ies on the late 1970s, Beer ﬁ nds a signiﬁ cant positive (i.e., “harmful”) relation 
between the degree of TNC presence and inequality. Notably, the eﬀ ect does not 
disappear when geographical dummies are included in the equation: although 
the coeﬃ  cient dwindles, it still turns out to be more than twice as large as its 
standard error, i.e. statistically signiﬁ cant. Th us, taken together, the two recent 
analyses of Tsai and Beer reveal a mixed picture. According to Tsai, the harmful 
eﬀ ects of TNC presence are restricted to East and Southeast Asia, whereas Beer 
ﬁ nds a more general relation that is valid for most of the countries covered by her 
sample. However, it would seem rather pointless to try and trace back these dif-
ferences to their source, for all analyses we have discussed to this point—includ-
ing the old studies covering the late 1960s—entirely neglect the problem of 
reverse causation, which makes it impossible to draw clear-cut conclusions. As 
long as TNC presence and inequality are measured simultaneously, any correla-
tion or regression coeﬃ  cient found can be interpreted in two ways. Whilst the 
ﬁ ndings discussed to this point support the pessimistic hypothesis that TNCs 
create inequality, so too can it be argued that unequal societies attract TNCs, 
since only those societies provide cheap labor as well as sizeable elites with suf-
ﬁ cient purchasing power to buy TNC products. 
So far the only studies that avoid the problem of reverse causation are the 
analyses of Beer and Boswell (2002) as well as Kentor (2001). In their second 
model to explain top quintile income concentration around 1995, Beer and 
Boswell (2002) include a measure of inequality as from about 1980 as an instru-
ment. Consequently, the other independent variables, including TNC presence, 
are now bound to predict changes in inequality, and the direction of causality is 
set. Th e eﬀ ect of introducing earlier income concentration as an instrumental 
predictor is impressive. In fact, almost all previously signiﬁ cant predictors lose 
their signiﬁ cance in this “dynamic” version of the model. To some extent this 
is true for TNC presence as well. We can thus conclude that the strong rela-
tion between TNC presence and income concentration found by Beer (1999) 
and many others is inﬂ uenced by the fact that TNCs tend to build up their 
foreign aﬃ  liates in unequal societies rather than elsewhere. When controlling 
9.  Th e results Alderson and Nielson list allow the tentative conclusion that the contri-
bution of TNC presence to inequality has been growing over the last decades. Th e authors 
control for year of measurement and ﬁ nd a very substantial positive eﬀ ect of this control 
variable on the dependent inequality. Since time of measurement and TNC presence are 
positively correlated in this era of globalization, this result might grasp the generally increas-
ing eﬀ ect of TNC presence. Yet, further research has to disentangle the eﬀ ects of TNC 
presence and other potential factors of inequality that have been increasing during the 
post-war era as well (trade, privatization of state enterprises etc.). It would come as no sur-
prise, had we to reject our tentative conclusion. For instance, Beer’s analysis of data for the 
mid-1980s reveals not stronger, but weaker, eﬀ ects from TNC presence on inequality than 
the studies on the late 1960s. In Bornschier’s study on inequality around 1967 (Bornschier 
1983: Table 1), including TNC presence as an additional predictor increases the explana-
tory power of the model (i.e., the adjusted R-square) by 17 percent points, whereas the 
corresponding increase in Beer’s model amounts to only 10 percent points. However, no 
deﬁ nite conclusions can be drawn from this diﬀ erence, since the studies employ diﬀ erent 
operational deﬁ nitions of inequality: Beer uses the top 10 and the top 20 share of total 
income to measure inequality, whereas Bornschier utilizes the more common Gini index. 
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do not go hand in hand. In the late 1960s their correlation is positive but low 
(r=.32 in Bornschier 1980), whereas in the 1980s it turns out to be signiﬁ cantly 
negative (Herkenrath 1999). Th at is, at low levels of TNC presence, fresh foreign 
investment tends to be substantive, and host country growth beneﬁ ts from the 
activities of TNCs. With increasing TNC presence, though, foreign investment 
slows down. Eventually, the growth-enhancing eﬀ ect of fresh investment is over-
shadowed by the disadvantageous structural impact of TNC presence, and the 
net eﬀ ect becomes negative. Th e conclusion from these early studies is that, per 
saldo and in the long run, TNCs do not add to national economic growth and 
worldwide convergence. 
Some years later, Dixon and Boswell (1996a, b) reveal additional evidence in 
favor of the pessimistic position. Re-analyzing the data collected by Bornschier 
and Chase-Dunn (1985), they ﬁ rst introduce some changes in the research design 
in order to settle Firebaugh’s criticisms of earlier speciﬁ cations (Firebaugh 1992). 
In spite of these changes, Dixon and Boswell (1996a) again ﬁ nd a negative coef-
ﬁ cient for TNC presence as well as a positive investment eﬀ ect. In a subsequent 
study (ibid. 1996b), they also consider the interaction of TNC presence and 
domestic investment (see hypotheses h1.3 and h2.3 in the present paper), ﬁ nding 
strong support for the pessimistic contention that the presence of TNCs ham-
pers the income-generating capacity of domestic investment. 
Finally, we need to mention the interesting ﬁ ndings of Kentor (1998) who 
relates accumulated stocks of foreign capital in 1938 (divided by gross domestic 
product) to subsequent income growth. Th e analysis reveals that TNC presence 
in 1938 has a short-term (ﬁ ve-year) positive eﬀ ect, which is followed by a 20-year 
lagged negative eﬀ ect beginning in 1960. Th is negative eﬀ ect on economic growth 
lasts at least 30 years. Kentor’s unique study thus reveals astonishing long last-
ing eﬀ ects that are well in line with our interpretation of the ﬁ ndings presented 
above.10 
To sum up, almost all studies discussed so far reveal a negative eﬀ ect from 
TNC presence on economic growth that is only partially oﬀ set by the positive 
impact of subsequent investment. Th e problem with these studies is that they 
for this reverse relation, the estimated impact of TNC presence on (changes in) 
inequality becomes much weaker. Yet, the statistical relation remains positive 
and signiﬁ cant, and it still supports the pessimistic position. Accordingly, Beer 
and Boswell (2002: abstract) conclude “that dependence on foreign investment 
as a development strategy, especially compared to domestic and human capital 
investment, may be misguided for nations concerned with equality.” Kentor 
(2001), who analyzes the eﬀ ect of TNC presence on income inequality changes 
within a complex system of structural equations, clearly supports this ﬁ nding. 
He ﬁ nds that “[f ]oreign investment dependence in 1980 has a signiﬁ cant positive 
eﬀ ect on growth of income inequality 1980–90” (ibid.: 450). 
However, it should be noted that the eﬀ ect of TNC presence on inequality 
shows a relatively great standard error in both analyses. In Beer and Boswell 
(1999), for instance, the regression slope of TNC presence is signiﬁ cant only at 
the 10 level (in one-tailed tests). In Kentor (2001), the critical ratio for the cor-
responding eﬀ ect is well below 2.0. Unfortunately, there is no straightforward 
interpretation of this. Whilst it can be argued that the pessimistic case is rather 
weak, so too can one think of alternative explanations for these “inﬂ ated” stan-
dard errors. First, the relatively large error could be due to the data problems and 
measurement errors discussed in section 3. Second, following Tsai, one could 
argue that the results of Beer and Boswell are inﬂ uenced by Tsai’s “socially toler-
able ceiling for inequality.” Yet another interpretation could refer to the skeptical 
position: perhaps a number of “intelligent” states have successfully prevented 
inequality from rising in spite of a strong TNC presence.
Economic Growth 
What are the eﬀ ects of TNC presence on economic growth? Empirical work 
on these eﬀ ects in the 1960s and 1970s is discussed by Bornschier and Chase-
Dunn (1985: chapters 5–7), who also present extended and improved re-estima-
tions. As mentioned in the introduction to the present paper, all results for this 
early time period indicate that the level of TNC presence has a signiﬁ cant nega-
tive impact on GDP per capita growth. Th is implies underdevelopment, since 
the potential for catching-up in the world system remains unexploited. However, 
the net eﬀ ect of TNC activities is not necessarily negative right from the begin-
ning. Some of the early studies show that the convergence-reducing impact of 
TNC presence can be oﬀ set as long as the foreign ﬁ rms keep on investing. 
Bornschier (1980), for instance, ﬁ nds a negative eﬀ ect of TNC presence 
in 1967 (as measured by the number of foreign aﬃ  liates) on income per capita 
growth 1965–75, but a positive eﬀ ect for fresh TNC investment (i.e. FDI inﬂ ows) 
from 1967 to 1973. Both coeﬃ  cients are highly signiﬁ cant. However, the problem 
for late development is that TNC presence and subsequent TNC investment 
10.  Since Kentor (1998) does not control for fresh TNC investment, the interpreta-
tion of his ﬁ ndings is diﬃ  cult. Most countries with a marked TNC presence already in 
the 1930s received considerably less new FDI in subsequent years than more independent 
countries. Th us, the dissatisfying economic development of these countries emphasized in 
Kentor’s study can be attributed either to the high levels of TNC presence in the past or to 
the absence of fresh FDI inﬂ ows later on. 
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are not representative of the present time, since they draw upon data from 1938 
(Kentor 1998), the late 1960s and the early 1970s (all others). Th e question as to 
how TNCs inﬂ uence world development in the contemporary era of increased 
economic integration remains unanswered. Th ere are but three studies that 
analyze more recent data material, namely Kentor (2001), de Soysa and Oneal 
(1999), and Herkenrath (1999). While Kentor (2001) still ﬁ nds a negative eﬀ ect 
of foreign capital dependence in 1980 on growth in 1990–97, the other two stud-
ies come to results that diﬀ er quite notably from previous ﬁ ndings. 
De Soysa and Oneal (1999) who examine data for 1980–90 are unable to reveal 
a signiﬁ cant eﬀ ect of TNC presence on the rate of economic growth, whereas 
fresh TNC investment still appears to exert a positive impact. Accordingly, the 
authors conclude their research with a very optimistic outlook, and claim that 
“[d]eveloping countries need not fear that the presence of foreign multinational 
corporations tends to retard or distort development” (ibid.: 778). During the 
recent upswing of global economic integration, it is argued, TNC activities have 
somehow become harmless. At the same time, Herkenrath (1999) ﬁ nds neither a 
presence eﬀ ect nor an investment eﬀ ect. In addition, Herkenrath also fails to ﬁ nd 
the conditional eﬀ ect discovered by Dixon and Boswell (1996b). 
However, both studies suﬀ er from serious shortcomings. While Herkenrath’s 
ﬁ ndings represent a very small sample of only 46 countries, de Soysa and Oneal 
analyze a suﬃ  ciently large number of cases but fail to take into account Dixon 
and Boswell’s innovative interaction model. Besides, both studies pay very little 
attention to the data problems outlined in section 3.11 Th erefore, recent research 
does not provide a trustworthy answer on whether the consequences of TNC 
activities in the 1980s actually do diﬀ er from the consequences found in the late 
1960s. Hence, we clearly need further tests. So far we can only conclude that to 
date it has never been possible to establish evidence in favor of the conventional 
position (h1.2), i.e., TNC presence has never shown a positive eﬀ ect on economic 
growth. 
NEW FINDINGS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION
In our own analyses we try to replicate the previous studies on the 1980s and, 
at the same time, to overcome their weaknesses. Th us, we investigate a much a 
larger sample than Herkenrath (1999)—namely 84 cases, including a sub-sample 
of 63 less developed countries—and also test for the conditional model that has 
been neglected by de Soysa and Oneal (1999). All analyses are carried out with 
data for 1980–90 as well as 1985–95 in order to enable direct comparisons with 
the two other studies that use contemporary data. 
Th e dependent variable in all our calculations is the growth rate of gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, which is measured by the diﬀ erence of the 
log-values for the ﬁ rst and the last year of the period under study.12 Th e predic-
tors are: the initial level of development (as measured by GDP per capita in 
PPP-corrected prices), domestic investment rate (operationalized by the growth 
rate of the total stock of real capital), average trade rate (imports plus exports as 
a percentage of GDP), absolute size of the economy (indicator: average level of 
GDP in absolute terms), and human capital (indicator: secondary school enroll-
ment ten years before the period under study). Additionally, we also include 
the foreign investment rate (as measured by the growth rate of the FDI inward 
stock), which is supposed to represent the presumed positive impact of fresh 
TNC investment. Detailed information on the construction of the variables as 
well as the data sources are presented in the Appendix. 
Th e long-term eﬀ ects of TNC presence are captured by the variable TNC 
dummy, which is based on the ratio between the inward FDI stock and the total 
stock of (real) capital. Th is ratio is used to split the sample into two equal groups 
of countries by using the median as a threshold. Countries with values above the 
median are given the value “1” for the TNC dummy, whereas countries with levels 
below the median are coded “0.” By creating this dummy variable we try to cope 
with the measurement errors in UNCTAD’s data mentioned in section 3. Th e 11.  Given the measurement problems mentioned in section 3, the predictor PEN 
does not actually represent an interval-scaled variable and, thus, violates one of the central 
requirements of mutliple regression analysis. Even the rank order of measurements may be 
disturbed. Yet, unfortunately, it is completely unclear as to how the error may have inﬂ u-
enced the results. Th is is because at least two predictors, namely “foreign capital penetra-
tion” and “foreign investment ﬂ ows,” are aﬀ ected. While measurement errors usually bias 
the results of analytical procedures in favor of the null hypothesis, the present case may well 
be diﬀ erent : ‘when there are several badly measured variables, or the errors depart from 
classical assumptions, then biases may go in either direction” (Temple 1999: 130). 
12.  We also performed our analyses using percentage increases of GDP per 
capita as measures of economic growth (y=[GDPc1990–GDPc1980]/GDPc1980*100 and 
y=[GDPc1995–GDPc1985]/GDPc1985*100). Th e results are almost identical to the results 
presented above. Th is is not surprising, however, since the two indicators of economic 
growth are highly correlated (Pearson’s r = .987 for the period 1980–90 in the the total 
sample). 
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procedure draws upon Scheuch’s recommendation to recode faulty measures 
onto lower scale levels and to summarize the data in categories greater than the 
presumed measurement error (Scheuch 1966: 140).13 
Th e results reported in table 1 refer to the direct eﬀ ect of TNC presence on 
economic growth predicted in hypotheses h1.2 and h2.2. Th e ﬁ rst thing worth 
noting is the equations’ great explanatory power.14 Adjusted R-squares range 
from 0.71 to 0.75, indicating that more than two-thirds of the observed variance 
in GDP per capita growth can be explained by the predictors we included.15 
Except for the TNC-related variables FIR and DUMMY all predictors turn out 
to have signiﬁ cant, and sometimes substantial, eﬀ ects on the dependent variable. 
Th e results clearly conﬁ rm the assumptions of standard economic theory. Th e 
regressions of growth on domestic investment as well as on trade openness both 
show the presumed positive slopes, while the signiﬁ cant positive coeﬃ  cient for 
market size nicely illustrates the existence of growth-enhancing scale eﬀ ects. We 
also ﬁ nd a signiﬁ cant positive eﬀ ect for human capital. 
In the period 1980–90 (cols. 1 and 2) we observe a marked convergence eﬀ ect, 
which indicates that less developed economies tend to grow substantially faster 
than others do (ceteris paribus). Th is result, however, is not robust. In the second 
period (1985–95), the negative regression of GDP per capita growth on the initial 
level of development is signiﬁ cantly diﬀ erent from zero only in the total sample 
of 84 countries (col. 3). In the sub-sample of 63 less developed countries (col. 4), 
13.  “[T]he intervals for grouped data (or when grouping them) and the threshold of 
sensitivity for a measure should be just greater than the possible errors in the data. […] If 
there is any reason to suspect error, one should sacriﬁ ce some information and settle for a 
rougher measure” (Scheuch 1966: 140). 
14.  Th e usual battery of diagnostic tests was examined to make sure that the results 
in this article were not unduly inﬂ uenced by outlier values, inﬂ uential cases, and excessive 
collinearities (VIFs are reported in each table). Regarding the coeﬃ  cients reported in table 
1, centered leverage values and standardized df-betas revealed the existence of several inﬂ u-
ential cases. We removed these cases from the respective samples and re-ran the models 
(n=78 for model 1, n=57 for model 2, n=76 for model 3, and n=55 for model 4). Th e results, 
however, showed no substantial deviations from the results reported above.
15.  Th e Variance Inﬂ ation Factors (VIFs) in some of our equations are higher than 
many statisticians would like. Normally a VIF of 2.5 or above indicates a possible prob-
lem of multicollinearity that may be distorting the regression estimates (Allison 1999). 
However, in the cases at hand the independent variables are not highly correlated with one 
another and the regression estimates seem to be within ranges that can be considered rea-
sonable on theoretical and methodological grounds. It should also be noted that the highest 
VIFs are related to the inclusion of the variable SEC. When we re-run the models in tables 
1 and A-2 without this predictor, all VIFs turn out to be well below 2.5. Yet, excluding SEC 
does not change the results for our measures of TNC penetration at all. In the conditional 
models reported in tables 2 and 3, the situation is very similar: when excluding SEC, there 
are no VIFs at 2.5 or above except for the interaction terms and their components. Th e 
latter ﬁ nding is not surprising, though, since the use of interaction terms is always associ-
ated with some (moderate) multicollinearity.
Table 1 – Dependent Variable: GDP per capita growth; OLS regressions
1980–90 1985–95
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Level of Development (DEV)
GDP/capita 1980 and 1985 (PPP-values) ............................ b = – .03** – .00** – .02** – .00
ß = – .29 – .36 – .22 – .06
(t =– 3.7) (– 3.9) (– 2.7) (– .6)
  [VIF =  1.7] [2.5] [1.8] [2.5]
Domestic investment rate (DIR)
Growth of total capital stock..........................................................  .31** .28** .42** .43**
 .54 .51 .68 .70
(8.4) (6.5) (10.1) (9.5)
  [1.2] [1.4] [1.3] [1.4]
Openness (OPEN)
Average trade ratio .........................................................................  .00** .00** .00** .00*
 .42 .48 .27 .19
(6.0) (5.5) (3.5) (2.2)
  [1.4] [1.7] [1.6] [2.0]
Size of the economy (SIZE)
Average GDP 1980, 85, 90 and 1985, 90, 95 .......................  .03** .07** .02† .05**
 .25 .52 .18 .31
(2.7) (5.1) (1.8) (3.1)
  [2.5] [2.3] [2.9] [2.5]
Human capital (SEC)
Secondary school enrollment rate 1970 and 1975 ....................  .00** .00† .00* .00†
 .29 .17 .25 .15
(3.0) (1.8) (2.3) (1.7)
  [2.8] [1.9] [3.2] [2.0]
Foreign investment rate (FIR)
Growth of foreign capital stock ......................................................  .03 .04 – .03 – .02
 .09 .12 – .10 – .06
(1.3) (1.5) (– 1.4) (– .7)
  [1.5] [1.5] [1.5] [1.6]
TNC dummy (DUMMY)
TNC penetration in 1980 and 1985 ........................................ – .01  – .01 – .01 .01
– .04 – .02 – .00 .05
(– .6) (– .3) (– .1) ( .6)
  [1.2] [1.3] [1.4] [1.4]
Constant ........................................................................................  – .38** – .81** – .29** – .56**
(t= – 4.0) (– 5.7) (– 2.5) (– 3.4)
R2 adjusted ....................................................................................  .71  .72 .71 .75
Number of Cases........................................................................ .84 .63 .84 .63
.(LDCs) .(LDCs)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<=0.1 (two-tailed tests)
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tions of equal, or even greater, plausibility. It should be noted, for instance, that 
the present ﬁ ndings are also in perfect accordance with the skeptical position’s 
claim that dependence on TNC presence still tends to have unfavorable eﬀ ects, 
except in those (few) countries where the activities of foreign ﬁ rms are regulated 
by adequate policies. 
We must concede, however, that our decision to use a dichotomous measure 
of TNC presence in the above analyses is not entirely unproblematic. While the 
transformation of the actual FDI data into a dummy variable drastically reduces 
the eﬀ ects of measurement error, it also minimizes all “sound” information the 
original measure may have contained. Th us, to put it in the words of an anony-
mous reviewer, “the cure may have killed the cat.” To address this problem, we 
reestimate the models from table 1 with several alternative speciﬁ cations of TNC 
presence. Th e results for these alternative measures are shown in table 1b (due 
to space constraints, we only report the coeﬃ  cients for our TNC measures—all 
other numbers, including adjusted R-squares and constants, are basically the 
same as in table 1). 
In the ﬁ rst row, TNC presence is represented by the continuous variable 
PEN. Its name, PEN, stands for “TNC penetration,” and the variable directly 
draws upon the actual data on FDI stocks presented in the United Nations’ 
from which the highly industrialized benchmark countries were removed, the 
eﬀ ect “disappears.” Th e world’s poorest countries do not seem to beneﬁ t from 
a greater growth potential than countries on a medium level of development. 
It should be noted, though, that this ﬁ nding does not come totally unexpected. 
Dixon and Boswell (1996a, 1996b) as well as Firebaugh (1992) discover no con-
vergence eﬀ ect within their samples either.16
Concerning the variable “foreign investment rate” (FIR), our results require 
further explanation. At ﬁ rst glance, the insigniﬁ cant coeﬃ  cients for FIR seem to 
suggest that fresh TNC investment (as measured by FDI inward stock growth 
rates) has no eﬀ ect on GDP per capita growth whatsoever. Th is impression, 
however, is misleading. It should be noted that our models also control for total 
domestic investment, and that this measure already includes investment by 
TNC aﬃ  liates. Due to this restrictive condition, our foreign investment rate rep-
resents the marginal contribution of TNC investment. i.e., FIR simply measures 
whether foreign-controlled investment contributes relatively more to economic 
growth than total investment does (Borensztein et al. 1995). Yet, as indicated by 
our results, there is no such eﬀ ect. Unlike most other studies on the subject, but 
in accordance with the results of Herkenrath (1999), we can thus conclude that 
TNC investment does not outperform investment by local entrepreneurs when 
it comes to encouraging economic progress. 
As regards the eﬀ ect of TNC presence, the results in table 1 are straight-
forward. Introducing our dichotomous TNC dummy does not improve the 
explanatory power of the test models at all, and in neither period nor sample is 
it a signiﬁ cant predictor of economic growth. While contradicting all empirical 
results for the late 1960s, this result clearly conﬁ rms the ﬁ ndings of most contem-
porary studies. Using a dummy variable instead of measuring TNC presence on 
higher scale-level seems to make no diﬀ erence. We are as unable to detect a sys-
tematic linear and unconditional eﬀ ect from TNC presence on national develop-
ment as de Soysa and Oneal (1999) or Herkenrath (1999) are. Our results thus 
conﬁ rm the conclusion that, for the 1980s and early 1990s, the hypothesis h1.2 
of the conventional position as well as h2.2 of the pessimistic position need to 
be rejected. Yet, contrary to de Soysa and Oneal (1999), we do not conclude that 
contemporary TNCs are harmless and of no relevance for their host countries. 
Th is interpretation would be premature, since there are alternative interpreta-
16.  Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985: table 5) reveal a statistically signiﬁ cant late 
developer’s advantage only when including core nations in their analysis. 
1980–90 1985–95
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PEN
TNC presence 1980 and 1985, actual FDI stock ................... b= – .00  – .00 .00 .00
ß= – .04 – .04 .02 .07
(t= – .6) (– .4) ( .2) ( .9)
  [VIF= 1.5] [1.6] [1.5] [1.5]
PEN 5
TNC presence, five categories .......................................................  – .00  – .00  .00 .01
 – .02 – .03  .03 .07
 (– .4) (– .3) ( .4) (1.0)
  [1.4] [1.5] [1.4] [1.4]
PEN 3
TNC presence, three categories .....................................................  – .00  – .00  .01 .02
 – .00 – .00  .04 .09
 (– .0) (– .0) ( .6) (1.2)
 [1.4] [1.4] [1.3] [1.3]
PEN 2
TNC presence, dichotomous measure (mean split) ...................  – .00  – .00  .01 .02
 – .01 – .00  .03 .06
 (– .1) (– .0) ( .4) ( .8)
[1.3] [1.4] [1.3] [1.4]
Number of Cases........................................................................ .84 .63 .84 .63
.(LDCs) .(LDCs)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<=0.1 (two-tailed tests)
Table 1b – Results for alternative measures of TNC penetration in equations  
(1)–(4) of Table 1
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World Investment Report (UNCTAD 1995; see Appendix for details on the 
construction of PEN). In the second row, we transform PEN into an ordinal 
variable with ﬁ ve categories of equal width (PEN5), whereas row 3 introduces 
a variable with three categories (PEN3). In row 4, PEN is ﬁ nally transformed 
into a dichotomous measure by using the variable’s mean (instead of the median) 
as a threshold. Countries with PEN values above this threshold are coded “1,” 
whereas countries exhibiting PEN values below the variable’s mean are coded “0” 
(PEN2). Yet, the results in table 1b reveal no surprise whatsoever. None of the 
various measures of TNC presence show a signiﬁ cant eﬀ ect on GDP per capita 
growth, irrespective of what period and what sample of countries we analyze.17 
In table 2, we investigate the validity of the hypotheses h1.3 and h2.3, which 
claim that the presence of foreign TNCs shapes, in one way or another, the 
growth-spurring eﬀ ect of domestic investment. Th e results mainly re-conﬁ rm 
the existence of the growth-adverse conditional eﬀ ect discovered by Dixon and 
Boswell (1996b), since the corresponding slope dummy, the interaction term 
“TNC dummy * domestic investment rate,” reveals a signiﬁ cant negative coef-
ﬁ cient. Th us, the conventional assumption h1.3 has to be rejected. Although 
TNC aﬃ  liates may bring modern and eﬃ  cient Western technologies into their 
host countries, we ﬁ nd absolutely no evidence of total domestic investment being 
more productive in those contexts where TNCs hold a dominant position. Th e 
contrary is the case: in countries with a more pronounced presence of foreign 
ﬁ rms, local investment appears to contribute relatively less to economic growth 
than elsewhere.18 Th is result stands for two phenomena: On the one hand, we 
can conclude that foreign ﬁ rms tend to supplant local ﬁ rms in the more proﬁ t-
able branches of the economy and push them into those sectors where private 
and social returns on investment are lower. On the other hand, our ﬁ ndings show 
that many developing countries tend to promote the presence of foreign ﬁ rms by 
oﬀ ering them attractive production sites with high-quality infrastructure while 
neglecting the domestic sector. In these cases, domestic ﬁ rms often lack the basic 
conditions for a frictionless production and, thus, yield below average.
Th e explanatory power of this conditional relation is by no means negli-
gible. As compared to the models for 1980–90 in table 1, the adjusted R-squares 
increase by 4 percentage points for the total sample and 3 percentage points 
for the LDC-sample when the slope dummy is included. (Note that the latter 
increase in the explained variance corresponds very nicely with the results of 
Dixon and Boswell for the late 1960s and early 1970s; see Dixon and Boswell 
1996a: table 1, and 1996b: table 1).
17.  While diagnostic tests discover the existence of several inﬂ uential cases, excluding 
these cases does not lead to signiﬁ cant changes. Th e only diﬀ erence is that the variable PEN 
then shows a signiﬁ cant negative eﬀ ect in model 1. Th e eﬀ ect, however, falls well short of 
statistical signiﬁ cance in the LDC-sample (model 2) and both equations for the years 1985-
95 (models 3 and 4). 
18.  It should be noted, however, that the observed interaction eﬀ ect is not robust. In 
Herkenrath’s analyses of the period 1985–93, for instance, the eﬀ ect turns out to be statisti-
cally insigniﬁ cant (Herkenrath forthcoming). 
Table 2 – Dependent Variable: GDP per capita growth; OLS regressions
1980–90 1985–95
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Level of Development (DEV)
GDP/capita 1980 and 1985 (PPP-values) ............................ b = – .03** – .00** – .03** – .00
ß = – .27 – .30 – .23 – .09
(t =– 3.6) (– 3.2) (– 3.0) (– .9)
  [VIF =  1.8] [2.2] [1.8] [2.5]
Domestic investment rate (DIR)
Growth of total capital stock..........................................................  .45** .41** .52** .52**
 .79 .77 .84 .86
(8.2) (6.4) (9.4) (8.7)
  [3.1] [3.5] [2.5] [2.6]
Openness (OPEN)
Average trade ratio .........................................................................  .00** .00** .00** .00*
 .40 .45 .29 .22
(6.1) (5.4) (3.9) (2.5)
  [1.4] [1.7] [1.7] [2.0]
Size of the economy (SIZE)
Average GDP 1980, 85, 90 and 1985, 90, 95 .......................  .03** .07** .02† .05**
 .28 .51 .17 .32
(2.8) (5.4) (1.8) (3.3)
  [2.5] [2.2] [2.9] [2.5]
Human capital (SEC)
Secondary school enrollment rate 1970 and 1975 ....................  .00** .00* .00* .00*
 .30 .18 .28 .19
(3.2) (2.2) (2.7) (2.1)
  [2.8] [1.7] [3.3] [2.0]
Foreign investment rate (FIR)
Growth of foreign capital stock ......................................................  .02 .04 – .04† – .02
 .08 .11 – .13 – .08
(1.2) (1.4) (– 1.9) (– 1.0)
  [1.5] [1.5] [1.6] [1.6]
TNC dummy (DUMMY)
TNC penetration in 1980 and 1985 ........................................ .01  .01  .01 .02
– .05  .06  .06 .10
(– .7) ( .7) ( .8) (1.3)
  [1.4] [1.5] [1.6] [1.6]
TNC dummy * domestic investment rate............................ – .22** – .20** – .19* – .18*
– .31 – .30 – .23 – .21
(– 3.3) (– 2.7) (– 2.6) (– 2.2)
  [2.9] [3.0] [2.3] [2.4]
Constant ........................................................................................  – .41** – .82** – .29** – .59**
(t= – 4.6) (– 6.2) (– 2.6) (– 3.7)
R2 adjusted ....................................................................................  .75  .75 .74 .77
Number of Cases........................................................................ .84 .63 .84 .63
.(LDCs) .(LDCs)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<=0.1 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 3 addresses the hypotheses h1.4 and h2.4. We analyze whether TNC 
presence produces a particularly positive, or negative, eﬀ ect in the poorest and 
most backward countries. It could be argued that the additive models of table 
1 do not reveal any signiﬁ cant TNC eﬀ ects simply because these eﬀ ects vary 
in accordance with the level of development. Yet, table 3 shows that there are 
no such conditional relations at work. Th e corresponding slope dummy, the 
interaction term “TNC dummy * level of development,” is never a signiﬁ cant 
predictor in our models. Th us, the conventional assumption of accelerated con-
vergence—TNCs are supposed to produce particularly positive eﬀ ects in the 
least developed countries—cannot be upheld. Yet the same is true for the pessi-
mistic claim that TNCs tend to produce their worst consequences in the world’s 
most backward economies. 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Regarding income inequality as the dependent variable, all empirical studies 
included in our survey indicate that there is a notable and statistically signiﬁ cant 
positive (i.e., “harmful”) relationship with TNC presence. It can be shown that, 
ceteris paribus, countries with high levels of dependence on foreign transnationals 
suﬀ er from comparatively high levels of income concentration. To some extent, 
this relation seems to be inﬂ uenced by the fact that TNCs preferably invest in 
unequal countries with relatively abundant cheap labor and wealthy elites. Yet, 
several studies show that the positive regression slope is still valid when the eﬀ ect 
of reverse causation is controlled for (Beer and Boswell 2002; Kentor 2001). We 
can therefore conclude that the activities of TNC aﬃ  liates indeed tend to aug-
ment income inequality and “may in fact beneﬁ t elite segments of the population 
over others” (Beer and Boswell 2002: 52). Th is ﬁ nding supports the expectations 
of the pessimistic position proposed by many dependencia and world-system 
theorists. It is important to note, however, that the corresponding regression 
coeﬃ  cients show relatively large standard errors. One could thus argue that the 
studies we surveyed rather support the skeptical approach towards TNCs than 
the pessimistic position. Possibly, the presence of foreign transnationals leads to 
an increase in income concentration only under a laissez faire regime, whereas 
in the (fewer) countries with apt and development-oriented bureaucracies this 
tendency is oﬀ set by adequate political measures. 
Although many advocates of corporate globalization contend that high 
TNC-induced inequality may be the price for accelerated economic develop-
ment, the present analyses of data on the 1980s and the 1990s reveal no statisti-
cally signiﬁ cant eﬀ ect from TNC presence on GDP per capita growth. Contrary 
to the predictions of standard economic theory, TNC aﬃ  liates do not systemati-
cally spur economic progress within their host countries. Nor do the activities 
of TNCs contribute to faster convergence of national incomes on a global level. 
In other words, TNCs are by no means “automatic” and systematic catalysts of 
socio-economic development, and the corresponding premises and principles 
underlying the Washington Consensus turn out to be mistaken. Although 
praised again and again by the most powerful organizations in the contempo-
1980–90 1985–95
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Level of Development (DEV)
GDP/capita 1980 and 1985 (PPP-values) ............................ b = – .02*  – .00** – .02* – .00
ß = – .24 – .40 – .21 – .13
(t =– 2.5) (– 3.3) (– 2.4) (– 1.2)
  [VIF =  2.7] [3.2] [2.2] [3.3]
Domestic investment rate (DIR)
Growth of total capital stock..........................................................  .31** .27** .42** .43**
 .26 .50 .68 .71
(8.5) (6.3) (10.0) (9.6)
  [1.2] [1.4] [1.3] [1.4]
Openness (OPEN)
Average trade ratio .........................................................................  .00** .00** .00** .00*
 .42 .49 .27 .19
(5.9) (5.6) (3.5) (2.1)
  [1.4] [1.7] [1.7] [2.0]
Size of the economy (SIZE)
Average GDP 1980, 85, 90 and 1985, 90, 95 .......................  .03** .08** .02† .05**
 .26 .54 .18 .31
(2.8) (5.3) (1.8) (3.1)
  [2.5] [2.3] [2.9] [2.5]
Human capital (SEC)
Secondary school enrollment rate 1970 and 1975 ....................  .00** .00† .00* .00†
 .28 .15 .25 .16
(2.9) (1.8) (2.3) (1.8)
  [2.8] [1.7] [3.3] [2.0]
Foreign investment rate (FIR)
Growth of foreign capital stock ......................................................  .02 .04 – .03 – .02
 .09 .12 – .10 – .06
(1.2) (1.4) (– 1.4) (– .7)
  [1.5] [1.5] [1.5] [1.6]
TNC dummy (DUMMY)
TNC penetration in 1980 and 1985 ........................................ – .01  – .02 – .01 – .01
– .04 – .09 – .00 – .06
(– .6) (– .8) (– .0) (– .5)
  [1.2] [2.9] [1.4] [2.8]
TNC dummy * initial level of development .......................... – .01  .00 – .00 .00
– .07  .09 – .01 .15
(– .9) ( .8) (– .1) (1.4)
  [1.8] [3.2] [1.6] [3.1]
Constant ........................................................................................  – .39** – .84** – .29** – .54**
(t= – 4.1) (– 5.9) (– 2.5) (– 3.4)
R2 adjusted ....................................................................................  .71  .72 .71 .75
Number of Cases........................................................................ .84 .63 .84 .63
.(LDCs) .(LDCs)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<=0.1 (two-tailed tests)
Table 3 – Dependent Variable: GDP per capita growth; OLS regressions
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rary world system, unconditional openness towards TNC investment is not 
an appropriate remedy for underdevelopment. Governments in the South and 
everywhere should refrain from trying to attract TNC investment à tout prix. 
As indicated by our additional tests with interactive equations, tax incentives for 
foreign investors and other TNC-friendly policies probably just diminish the 
important growth-generating capacity of the (neglected) local sector. 
Th en again, our ﬁ ndings not only contradict the optimistic view on TNCs 
proposed by standard economic theory. Concerning growth as the dependent 
variable, our results are at odds with the pessimistic position as well. We ﬁ nd no 
empirical support for the assumption that economic growth in developing coun-
tries is directly and systematically hampered by the presence of foreign-owned 
ﬁ rms. In this respect, our contemporary results diﬀ er substantially from the 
ﬁ ndings for the late 1960s and the 1970s. Th e earlier results, which unequivocally 
supported a critical and pessimistic view on TNCs’ activities, cannot be repli-
cated. Th e negative eﬀ ect of TNC presence on the growth-generating capacity 
of domestic investment discovered earlier by Dixon and Boswell (1996b) has 
remained, but the generally negative impact on growth and convergence seems 
to have weakened. 
Th is withering away of a previously strong statistical eﬀ ect leads us to a 
further question. How come a relation not signiﬁ cantly diﬀ erent from zero 
supplanted the negative growth eﬀ ect of TNC presence found in the 1960s and 
1970s? Following de Soysa and Oneal (1999), it could be argued that TNCs per 
se have become harmless for economic growth. Th is interpretation does not seem 
overly convincing, though. Neither the will of foreign transnationals to generate 
maximum economic proﬁ ts, nor their ability to rationally pursue this aim, have 
been subject to fundamental changes. In our opinion, the recent results and the 
fact that they diﬀ er from older ﬁ ndings should be interpreted in the light of the 
skeptical position presented in section 2. We contend that a signiﬁ cant number 
of developing country governments implemented “smart” regulations on foreign 
ﬁ rms, which now prevent TNC activities from displaying their potentially nega-
tive impact on socio-economic development in each and every situation.19 Yet, two 
points deserve to be mentioned. First, it should be clear that this state-oriented 
interpretation of our ﬁ ndings is rather tentative and requires further exploration. 
We clearly need more knowledge on the speciﬁ c possibilities, and limitations, of 
host country governments to convert the activities of foreign-controlled ﬁ rms 
into equitable growth. Th is knowledge can only be gathered in detailed case 
studies and “small-N comparisons,” which eventually result in policy variables 
to be used in future cross-national tests. Second, it should be pointed out that 
our analyses focus on medium-term eﬀ ects, i.e., the consequences of TNC pres-
ence within a 10-year growth period. Th e absence of such medium-term growth 
eﬀ ects for the 1980s and early 1990s does not preclude the existence of long-term 
eﬀ ects as discovered by Kentor (1998, 2001). To disentangle these medium-term 
and long-term eﬀ ects is thus an important task at the top of the research agenda. 
It can be accomplished by simultaneous consideration of past and present TNC 
activities in one empirical model.
Another interesting task for future research will be to theorize and inves-
tigate sector-speciﬁ c diﬀ erences. Th is becomes more and more critical, since 
TNCs from the service sector are nowadays playing a much more important role 
than two or three decades ago. Even in developing nations, TNC presence can 
no longer be equated with extractive activities or with industrial production for 
the host country’s internal market. Th ere are “new” types of TNC activities to be 
accounted for. Assuming that these new activities are more beneﬁ cial than the 
activities of traditional TNCs, this could serve as an additional explanation for 
the fact that our new results diﬀ er from older ﬁ ndings. Unfortunately, as men-
tioned in section 3, sectoral FDI data is very rare and thus unsuitable for broad 
cross-national studies. 
Finally, we need to go on studying not only TNCs but also other factors 
that inﬂ uence growth and income distribution. Only then can we disentangle the 
diverse sources of success and failure in overcoming the burden of underdevel-
opment. Th e better we can isolate TNC-related factors, the better our case for 
making TNCs accountable.
19.  Th is presumed increase in the number of governments pursuing adequate mea-
sures of dependency management may seem somewhat surprising, given that political pres-
sures forcing national governments to deregulate and liberalize TNC investment became 
much stronger. It would indeed be naïve to claim that the political opportunities for FDI-
regulating measures and other forms of dependency management could have grown. It can 
be argued, however, that more and more governments learned to use the existing (or even 
diminishing) scope for action to their countries’ maximum beneﬁ t , probably by copying to 
some extent the FDI policies of the successful late-developers Japan, Korea and Taiwan. 
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APPENDIX 
Sample²⁰ 
Th e sample contains the following 84 cases (*included in the sub-sample of 
63 developing countries): Algeria*, Argentina*, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh*, 
Belgium, Benin*, Brazil*, Burkina Faso*, Burundi*, Cameroon*, Canada, 
Central African Republic*, Chile*, Colombia*, Republic of Congo*, Costa 
Rica*, Cote d’Ivoire*, Denmark, Dominican Republic*, Ecuador*, Egypt*, 
El Salvador*, Finland, France, Gabon*, Th e Gambia*, Ghana*, Greece, 
Guatemala*, Haiti*, Honduras*, Hong Kong*, Hungary*, Iceland, India*, 
Indonesia*, Ireland, Israel*, Italy, Jamaica*, Japan, Kenya*, Republic of Korea*, 
Lesotho*, Madagascar*, Malawi*, Malaysia*, Mali*, Mauritius*, Mexico*, 
Morocco*, Nepal*, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua*, Niger*, Nigeria*, 
Norway, Pakistan*, Papua New Guinea*, Paraguay*, Peru*, Philippines*, 
Portugal, Rwanda*, Senegal*, Singapore*, South Africa*, Spain, Sri Lanka*, 
Swaziland*, Sweden, Switzerland, Th ailand*, Togo*, Trinidad and Tobago*, 
Tunisia*, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay*, Venezuela*, 
Zambia*, Zimbabwe*.
Variables
GDP per capita growth (GROWTH) 
Growth rate of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPc) 1980–90 and 
1985–95;
x = lg10(GDPct)–lg10(GDPct–1).
Source: World Bank (1999) for GDP figures in constant prices of 1995 and 
for total population.
GDP per capita growth 1985–95: the original value for Zambia constituted 
an outlier; it was thus recoded according to the procedure proposed by Born-
schier and Heintz (1979: 128). 
Initial level of Development (DEV)
PPP–corrected GDP per capita 1980 and 1985. 
Source: ibid.
While GDP per capita is logarithmically transformed in many cross-national 
studies (Dixon and Boswell 1996a, 1996b; Firebaugh 1992, 1996; Kentor 
1998, 2001; and many others), this transformation is not needed here. Since 
we use PPP-corrected values, this variable neither exhibits an overly skewed 
distribution, nor does it contain any outliers. (To eliminate any doubts, we 
re-estimated all models in table 1 using GDP per capita in its logged form. 
The results are the same.) 
It was necessary, however, to residualize this variable from total GDP (i.e., the 
variable SIZE) in all growth models for the total sample (n=84) to deal with 
problems of high multicollinearity (in the case of GDPc[PPP]80 and SIZE80/85/
90, for instance, Pearson’s r is .73). We therefore regressed the actual GDP per 
capita data on SIZE (see below), and saved the residuals. Residualizing was 
not necessary in the models for the sub-sample of 63 LDCs, since DEV and 
SIZE show only modest correlations (see tables A–1b and A–1d). 
Domestic investment rate(DIR) 
Growth rate of total domestic capital stock (DS) 1980–90 and 1980–95;
x = lg10(DSt)–lg10(DSt–1).
Total domestic capital stocks are estimated by adding up gross domestic 
investment over a period of 10 years and taking account of an annual depre-
ciation rate of 10%: 
DSt=GDIt–10*1/10+ GDIt–9*2/10+…+GDIt–0*10/10
Source: ibid. for gross domestic investment rates (GDI/GDP) and GDP fig-
ures in constant prices of 1995. 
Size of the economy (SIZE) 
Average GDP 1980, 1985 and 1990, or 1985, 1990 and 1995 (logged 
values);
x=1/3*lg10(GDP1980)+1/3*lg10(GDP1985)+1/3*lg10(GDP1990).
Source: ibid. for GDP figures in constant prices of 1995. 
20.  In an early draft version of this paper, which we presented at the XVth ISA World 
Congress in Brisbane (Australia), three cases (Nepal, Papua New Guinea, and Paraguay) 
were erroneously excluded from the sub-sample of developing countries. Th e results, how-
ever, were very similar to the results presented here. 
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We use logged values to correct for the highly skewed distribution of the raw 
data. The logarithmic transformation also eliminated the various outliers in 
the total sample as well as in the sub-sample of developing countries. 
Openness (OPEN) 
Average trade ratio (T) 1980, 1985 and 1990 or 1985,1990 and 1995;
x=1/3*T1980+1/3*T1985+1/3*T1990 or x=1/3*T1985+1/3*T1990+1/3*T1995.
Source: ibid. 
The values for two cases (Singapore and Hong Kong) were recoded.  
Human capital (SEC) 
Secondary school gross enrollment rate 1970 and 1975 
x = lg10(GDPct)–lg10(GDPct–1).
Source: ibid.
This indicator of human capital measures the total secondary school enroll-
ment, regardless of the students’ actual age, to the population of the age group 
corresponding to this level of education. 
Foreign investment rate(FIR) 
Growth rate of foreign capital stock (FS) 1980–90 and 1980–95;
x=lg10(FSt)–lg10(FSt–1).
Sources: UNCTAD (1995) for FS1980 and FS1990, UNCTAD (2000) for 
FS1995.
Foreign investment 1985–95: the values of Hungary and Zimbabwe both 
constituted outliers and were thus recoded. 
TNC presence (PEN) 
Relative importance of TNCs in 1980 and 1985, as measured by the ratio of 
FDI inward stock and total domestic capital stock;
x= FSt/DSt*100.
Sources: see above. 
TNC presence 1980: the values for Zimbabwe and Togo were recoded 
(although this is relevant only for the alternative tests reported in table 1b 
and has no influence on the construction of the TNC dummy).
TNC presence 1985: for three cases (Zimbabwe, Togo and Nigeria), the 
values were recoded. 
TNC dummy (Dummy)
Dichotomous measure of TNC presence 1980 and 1985. 
Cases are coded “0” on this variable, when their value on the variable “TNC 
presence” is below the median, otherwise they are given the value “1”. 
Table A-1a – Bivariate Correlations (Pearson's r-coefficients) for n=84 DCs 
and LDCs, 1980–90
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DIR OPEN SIZE SEC FIR DUMMY
(1) Level of development (DEV) – .10  .40 .00§ .46 .11 .09
(2) Domestic investment rate (DIR) .08 .03 – .02 .35  – .12
(3) Trade Openness (OPEN) – .28 .09 .08 .17
(4) Size of the economy (SIZE) .64 .33 – .23
(5) Human capital (SEC) .29 – .15
(6) Foreign investment rate (FIR) – .37
§ The zero correlation is due to the residualizing procedure described above.
Table A-1b – Bivariate Correlations (Pearson’s r-coefficients) for 
n=63 LDCs, 1980–90
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DIR OPEN SIZE SEC FIR DUMMY
(1) Level of development (DEV) – .18  .23 .53 .57 .11 – .08
(2) Domestic investment rate (DIR) .12 – .01 – .05 .44  – .14
(3) Trade Openness (OPEN) – .30 .17 .19 .17
(4) Size of the economy (SIZE) .47 .11 – .24
(5) Human capital (SEC) .11 – .16
(6) Foreign investment rate (FIR) – .35
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Table A-1c – Bivariate Correlations (Pearson’s r-coefficients) for n=84 DCs and 
LDCs, 1985–95
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DIR OPEN SIZE SEC FIR DUMMY
(1) Level of development (DEV) – .14  .38 .00§ .46 .00 .05
(2) Domestic investment rate (DIR) .20 .18  .07 .38  – .15
(3) Trade Openness (OPEN) – .25 .12 .22 .20
(4) Size of the economy (SIZE) .67 .17 – .20
(5) Human capital (SEC) .17 – .01
(6) Foreign investment rate (FIR) – .40
§ The zero correlation is due to the residualizing procedure described above.
Table A-1d – Bivariate Correlations (Pearson’s r-coefficients) for n=63 LDCs,
1985–95
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DIR OPEN SIZE SEC FIR DUMMY
(1) Level of development (DEV)  .06  .31 .54 .66 .15 – .03
(2) Domestic investment rate (DIR) .23  .20  .13 .37  – .16
(3) Trade Openness (OPEN) – .25 .24 .26 .15
(4) Size of the economy (SIZE) .51 .11 – .19
(5) Human capital (SEC) .19 – .03
(6) Foreign investment rate (FIR) – .46
Table A-2 – Basic models without TNC-related variables
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita growth; OLS regressions
1980–90 1985–95
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Level of Development (DEV)
GDP/capita 1980 and 1985 (PPP-values) ............................ b = – .03** – .00** – .02** – .00
ß = – .29 – .35 – .21 – .06
(t =– 3.7) (– 3.5) (– 2.7) (– .6)
  [VIF =  1.7] [2.2] [1.8] [2.5]
Domestic investment rate (DIR)
Growth of total capital stock..........................................................  .32** .31** .40** .41
 .30 .57 .67 .68
(9.6) (7.9) (10.1) (9.6)
  [1.0] [1.1] [1.2] [1.2]
Openness (OPEN)
Average trade ratio .........................................................................  .00** .00** .00** .00*
 .42 .50 .24 .19
(6.1) (5.3) (3.4) (2.2)
  [1.4] [1.6] [1.5] [1.9]
Size of the economy (SIZE)
Average GDP 1980, 85, 90 and 1985, 90, 95 .......................  .03** .07** .02†  .05**
 .29 .53 .17 .30
(3.2) (5.3) (1.7) (3.0)
  [2.4] [2.2] [2.8] [2.5]
Human capital (SEC)
Secondary school enrollment rate 1970 and 1975 ....................  .00** .00† .00* .00
 .30 .17 .24 .15
(3.1) (1.9) (2.3) (1.7)
  [2.8] [1.9] [3.1] [1.9]
Constant ........................................................................................  – .41** – .83** – .28** – .55**
(t= – 4.4) (– 5.9) (– 2.5) (– 3.4)
R2 adjusted ....................................................................................  .71  .72 .71 .75
Number of Cases........................................................................ .84 .63 .84 .63
.(LDCs) .(LDCs)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<=0.1 (two-tailed tests)
